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Interpreting human rights statutes through their objectives encourages 
their description as empowering instruments with their hortatory 
language emphasising the potential of each instrument to protect and 
promote rights. This article examines Victoria’s Equal Opportunity Act 
2010 (Vic) and Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
through a different lens and argues that a focus on their limitations and 
derogations offers a better understanding of the nature and extent of 
the human rights protection that each purports to provide.
These limitations are no mere peripheral encumbrances and help 
shape the rights protecting functions of each statute. This article adopts 
a social constructivist approach to explain how, as socially constructed 
instruments, the operation of the limitations reveals an ambivalent role 
for each statute. The design and functionality of each statute, with their 
self-limiting provisions, means that each acts to sustain as well as 
challenge the existing power relationships and social arrangements. 
I INTRODUCTION
We are more accustomed to interpreting human rights legislation in 
terms of its potential to deliver enhanced protection of our rights, both 
real and imagined. This interpretation should not be viewed as unusual 
when we acknowledge the dominance of legal analysis in the rights 
discourse and its tendency to be overly optimistic as to what human 
rights legislation can achieve.1 This legislation should rather be viewed 
in more ambiguous terms, often serving various powerful interests,
particularly those bolstering the political status quo. This article’s focus 
is upon the two principal Victorian human rights Acts, the Equal 
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1 Conor Gearty, ‘Against Judicial Enforcement’, in C Gearty and V Mantouvalou, 
Debating Social Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 1.
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Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (the EO Act) and the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (the Charter) and how they 
are framed by their various limitations and the extent to which these 
limits define how protecting of rights each statute is in its operation.
The objectives clauses of the two statutes contain a number of 
‘motherhood’ statements and the language of each statute tends to be 
generally hortatory rather than binding on duty holders. Such language 
is not uncommon when it comes to human rights legislation and is 
arguably somewhat misleading as to the statutes’ true impact. In spite 
of the normative content of each about how rights will be protected 
through its operation, each statute is an ordinary piece of legislation
and remains subject to amendment at will. 
Rather than as an asocial universal abstraction, rights as held by 
individuals are best seen as contextual and subject to the interaction 
between an individual and the rest of her society.2 If we accept that 
individual rights, as expressed through such legislation, are capable of 
limiting power or challenging existing power relationships, then it is 
equally understandable that such legislation, in the way it 
institutionalises these rights, can serve to sustain the existing power 
relationships in various ways. How a particular statute balances rights 
and whether and how certain rights are privileged over others can shape 
the nature and level of rights protection overall, whose interests are 
advanced, and the extent to which power may or may not be 
constrained. Particularly through how they are legally framed, rights 
can end up playing a highly ambivalent role in respect of power.3
This article examines each of these statutes through the lens of their 
limitations and argues that by focusing upon how the limitations and 
derogations within each of Victoria’s human rights statutes influence 
their design and operation we can better understand how each has been 
framed to be ambivalent instruments of the state. It is argued that the 
effect of these limitations and derogations should not be considered 
peripheral to the intent and operation of each statute but rather as 
central to understanding their rights-protecting capabilities. This article 
applies a social constructivist approach to argue that these human rights
statutes are conditioned by social liberalist understandings that 
consider formal equality as the norm and seek to confine the legislated 
rights to civil and political ones. The broader social reality within 
which these statutes have been enacted is one framed within the 
dominant (neo)liberal paradigm of contemporary society with its 
promotion of market-led politics and an aversion to state intervention.
The social constructivist explanatory approach postulates that the 
social reality is created through the interaction of social actors, bringing 
                                                                
2 Neil Stammers, ‘Human Rights and Power’ XLI (1993) Political Studies 70, 72–73.
3 Neil Stammers, ‘Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights’ 
(1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 980, 999.
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with them their ideas and interests, while at the same time being
conditioned by their particular social context. 
In this study, it is argued that despite the expansive human rights 
rhetoric of each statute, the nature of the human rights policy in action
of each is more restricted and is to be understood from how political
decision-makers have interpreted the social reality at the time of each 
statute’s enactment. According to this approach, how each particular 
social reality is constructed is necessary to fully appreciate its true 
nature4 and its role in shaping the legislation of that time. Of course, 
the influence of particular interests and ideas changes over time and 
this results in a changed social reality. This is something of which 
astute political decision-makers will be keenly aware.
How each of these statutes works in practice is a result of the interplay 
of these interests and their respective influence. In terms of rights 
legislation, how that reality is constructed determines the nature of the 
rights that are recognised, what effect will be given to them, and in 
doing so ‘provides the necessary conditions for intentional human 
activity as well as circumscribing it’.5 Interpreted in this way, we can 
see that the human rights as enunciated in the EO Act and the Charter 
have been ‘created, re-created, and instantiated by human actors in 
particular socio-historical settings and conditions’.6
While each statute makes reference to particular international human 
rights norms, their effectiveness in law and policy depends on the 
translation of these by political decision-makers influenced, as they
must be, by the dominant political discourse and ever mindful of 
important social and political interests. These are two ordinary Acts of 
Parliament and, as such, are expected to perform certain roles on behalf 
of society. Their dominant purpose is presented as the protection and 
promotion of certain human rights. This purpose will be supported by 
some social actors though there will be others, often highly influential 
social and economic actors, who see their interests being better served 
through the maintenance of certain constraints upon the protection of 
these rights.  
The increasing acceptance of rights within the social reality of 
contemporary Victoria is reflected in particular provisions in each of 
these statutes under consideration. That some of the rights protecting 
provisions would have been inconceivable in Victoria only two 
decades ago helps us to understand the impact of the changing social 
                                                                
4 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Penguin 
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5 Roy Bhasker, Reclaiming Reality (Verso, 1989) 77.
6 Ibid 981.
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reality within which political decision-makers find themselves.  
Equally, the continuing existence of certain restrictions to and 
limitations upon these rights also provides some of the answers to 
explain how the law can be used to limit the impact of any rights 
protecting changes.
Investigating these statutes as socially constructed instruments helps to 
explain the tension inherent in each statute as attempts are made to 
translate certain international legal human rights standards into 
domestic legislation while accommodating powerful social and 
economic interests. The social construction behind these legal 
instruments has been exposed periodically through, for instance,
debates over the impact of particular exceptions or exemptions in the 
EO Act and those around efforts to enhance the Charter’s enforcement 
regime. Legislators interpret the social reality in various ways, some 
perhaps seeing opportunities to advance the rights-protecting 
provisions, others perhaps seeking to bolster the rights limiting ones. 
The almost inevitable compromises that result, as had been the case 
with those at the time of the statutes’ enactment, in turn help us to 
understand the true nature of that changed social reality. 
The article will focus upon those provisions within each statute which, 
either as part of their design or operation, act to adjust both the statute’s
descriptive and normative rights-protecting content. In the EO Act a
number of provisions act positively to enhance substantive equality, 
such as in the recognition both of minorities in certain areas of 
employment and education, and of differential capacity, and these can 
be best explained in terms of the changed social reality since its 
predecessor was passed in 1995. Likewise, this can be seen in the 
Victorian government’s recent response to the 2015 Charter Review 
supporting certain recommendations. For instance, those seeking to 
assist the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission 
(the Commission) in its work promoting and protecting rights and the 
reconsideration of the exception of religious bodies from the Charter’s
public authority obligations can both be explained in terms of 
identifying changes to the contemporary social reality.
Against those provisions which reflect the hortatory statements in each 
statute as to the protection and promotion of rights must be placed those 
limitations and derogations that seriously compromise the 
effectiveness of particular rights-protecting provisions and more 
generally detract from the ability of each statute to protect rights. This 
article will discuss these in terms of the purpose they serve and how 
they reflect a social reality that either privileges certain powerful 
interests and/or, in broader terms, bolsters the (neo)liberal socio-
economic view prescribing a more limited role for rights-protecting 
statutes.
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This ambivalence inherent in each of the two statutes, as expressed 
through the interplay of rights and their limitations, varies depending 
upon which ideas influence which provisions. For instance, we find that 
some ideas support certain interests, such as those framing the right to 
privacy, while others serve to enhance the participation of minorities,
thereby limiting the right to equality. Still other ideas, such as allowing 
restrictive employment practices, are about privileging certain interests 
over others. Through a mix of limitations, derogations and their 
apparent contradictions we can identify the nature of the political 
compromises built into the structure and operation of each statute as 
they both give effect to certain rights while supporting the status quo 
and providing safety valves to seek to curtail demands for further rights 
restrictions. 
II NEOLIBERALISM AND THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY
Australia’s embrace of economic rationalism, as a variant of 
neoliberalism, in the 1980s brought with it deregulation, privatisation, 
de-institutionalisation and the contracting out of state services. 
Neoliberalism with its mantra of individualism treats all individuals as 
equal in a formal sense and its approach to economic management 
undermines the role of the state to champion changes to employment 
and social practices which would advance substantive equality, or the 
equality of outcomes.  In so doing, neoliberalism acts to effectively 
mask the underlying social inequality.7 Australian law and policy 
making around rights fits comfortably into what has been termed a 
liberal egalitarian paradigm where the regulating of apparent 
inequalities is of greater interest than advancing an ‘equality of 
condition’ amongst the people8 and appears more about process than 
results.9 Neoliberalism’s emphasis upon market-based policy 
outcomes has also brought with it a level of resistance by the state to 
framing legislation and advocating policy and practices which would 
empower people as rights holders. This has contributed to the 
reluctance to legislate a national bill of rights which would ideally 
empower people and, for example, impose further duties upon 
employers and educational authorities, the two most common targets 
of discrimination claims.
                                                                
7 Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in 
Australia (Oxford University Press, 1990) 14.
8 J Baker, K Lynch and S Cantillon, Equality. From Theory to Action (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 
2nd ed, 2009) 31.
9 Beth Gaze, ‘Context and Interpretation in Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2002) 26 
Melbourne University Law Review 325, 334.
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Australian anti-discrimination legislation and the two subnational bills 
of rights in the ACT and Victoria have not been immune from what can 
be called complacent apathy at best and a strident anti-rights sentiment 
at worst.10 Equality has been a more important value than individual 
liberty in Australia and the local variant of democracy has been very 
much about egalitarian notions of social justice.11 This particular 
notion of equality was expected to be delivered through a strong state, 
arranged federally and acknowledging the paramount position of 
parliament. 
While equality has had a strong resonance in the broader community,
often vernacularised in terms of some kind of ‘mateship’, it has been 
translated into legislation with a strong social liberalist flavour with its 
emphasis upon formal equality over substantive or outcome-oriented 
equality. There is a serious question over whether the state has, through 
its law making, moved beyond ‘same treatment’ and actually legislated 
to change social arrangements to address inequality. The EO Act 2010
made tentative moves towards addressing systemic discrimination but
amendments the following year drew back from this broader approach
to equality. What this means is that under Victorian legislation, the 
prevailing policy approach continues to be to view a particular problem
or issue, where discrimination is proven, as being about finding a 
remedy against a ‘bad individual in what is generally a fair and 
equitable society’ (Gaze 2002, 330). Both statutes address the right to 
equality but in slightly different ways. Where the EO Act 2010 refers 
to the elimination of discrimination and to the right to equality (as also 
included in the Charter) as part of its Objectives in section 3, the 
Charter refers to the principles of non-discrimination and equality in its 
Preamble and gives a broad equality guarantee in section 8, though this 
is narrower than the definition given in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).12
III LIMITING THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT
The EO Act 2010 introduced a positive duty on organisations to 
eliminate discrimination, sexual harassment and victimisation while 
encouraging the identification and elimination of the systemic causes 
of these. The EO Act states that it seeks to promote and protect the right 
to equality as found in the Charter and to promote and facilitate its 
                                                                
10 Australia’s reluctance to embrace human rights in a legislative form is as relevant 
today as it was two decades ago when highlighted by Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The 
Australian Reluctance About Rights’ (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 195 and 
Brian Galligan ‘Australia’s Political Culture and Institutional Design’, in P Alston 
(ed), Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (Centre for International and Public Law 
and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1994) 55.
11 Galligan, above n 10, 59–60. 
12 Justice Bell referred to this difference in Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti-
Discrimination) (Lifestyle Communities) (2009) VCAT 1869.
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progressive realisation as far as reasonably practicable. In particular, 
section 3 (d) (iii) states that for there to be substantive equality, 
reasonable adjustments, reasonable accommodation and the taking of 
special measures may be required. Adopting many of the 
recommendations of the 2008 Gardner review13, the Act recognises the 
need to progressively achieve substantive equality through requiring 
employers, educational authorities and service providers to make 
reasonable adjustments for a person who has an impairment and only 
allows discrimination in these areas once such efforts have been made 
(ss 20, 40 and 45). Only after the employer or authority has made 
reasonable adjustments can it then claim an exemption from the 
application of the Act with an exception allowed if the person 
providing access to or use of public premises could not reasonably be 
expected to avoid the discrimination. In this case, the onus is on the 
person providing the premises to show that it would be unreasonable to 
make the adjustments for access to or use of the premises by the 
impaired person (s 58). 
The 2010 EO Act was also a partial response to a 2009 report by the 
Victorian Parliament’s own Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee (SARC) (Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee 
2009b). The amendments which followed brought the Act into line 
with other jurisdictions and updated a number of important causative 
and comparative elements to the legislation. However, the broader 
framework of the limitations to the Act as well as a number of 
important exceptions remained. In all, the Act prohibited 
discrimination on 17 grounds and at the same time allowed for 
significant derogation from the right to equality through some 53 
exceptions. The limitations to the EO Act are to be found in the various 
derogations, namely its exceptions, exemptions and special measures.14
These instances of ‘legal exceptionalism’ effectively remove the 
jurisdiction of the anti-discrimination laws rather than acting as 
defences against the accepted application of these laws. 
A General Exceptions
The most important derogations are the general or automatic 
exceptions and while some have general application, others apply in 
                                                                
13 Julian Gardner, An Equality Act for a Fairer Victoria: Equal Opportunity Review 
Final Report (Department of Justice, 2008). This review was conducted by Julian 
Gardner, the former Public Advocate, for the Department of Justice.
14 Exceptions are provisions in the Act which excludes a specified activity or a 
specified entity from compliance with the Act while exemptions refer to permission 
granted by a tribunal or administrative agency to someone or an organisation which 
excuses their compliance.
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specific areas of public activity.  The EO Act provides for exceptions 
which exclude a specified activity or a specified entity from 
compliance with the Act’s anti-discrimination provisions and act to 
either privilege certain interests or to protect interests which might 
otherwise be disadvantaged. The 2010 EO Act retained but tightened 
the general exceptions. This reflected a growing recognition that the 
social reality had slightly changed in favour of the removal or dilution 
of certain restrictive employment practices while the then government 
was reluctant to unduly disturb the status quo so as to invite a reaction 
from certain identified important social interests, such as organised 
religion. There are a range of specific exceptions in the Act on the basis 
of religion and relate to the activities of religious bodies, religious 
officials and religious schools. Religious bodies can claim a broad 
exception which allows them to discriminate on the basis of a person’s 
religious belief or activity, sex, sexual orientation, lawful sexual 
activity, marital status, parental status or gender identity. All the 
religious body needs to show is that its action conforms to its religious 
doctrines, beliefs or principles and that the action was necessary to 
avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of its adherents (ss 82(2)). 
The religious exception has been a matter of some political 
contestation. An amendment, as part of the EO Act 2010, removed the 
application to employment unless the organisation could show that 
conforming with the religions’ doctrines, principles or beliefs was an 
‘inherent requirement’ of the position. The new Coalition government 
reversed this in 2011 and removed the inherent requirement test and 
widened the religious exception. The then Attorney-General, in 
reinstating the wider exemption, argued that the provision in the EO 
Act 2010 would ‘dramatically undermine the rights of parents to send 
their children to schools that are able to provide the values-based 
education their parents are seeking for them….’.15 While a little 
obscure, it can be seen that in public policy terms, this reinstatement 
represents a widening of the scope of the private sphere in terms of a 
child’s education, despite the fact that these religious schools receive 
extensive public funding.16 To complement this exception in the EO 
Act, the Charter does not require a public authority to act compatibly 
with a human right if it would have the effect of impeding or preventing 
a religious body from acting in conformity with the religious doctrines, 
beliefs or principles (ss 38(4)). This reveals both the continuing 
importance of the liberal notion of the public/private divide, supporting 
an unregulated private sphere linking with the continuing social power 
of organised religion to support discriminatory employment practices.
This remains a highly controversial exception given its broad nature 
and the obvious conflict between the right to religious freedom and the 
                                                                
15 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, (2011) Legislative Assembly, 5 May, 1363–67.
16 Margaret Thornton, ‘Excepting Equality in the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act’ 
(2010) 23 (3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 240, 242–43.
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right to equality. While all people should be entitled to equal treatment 
in being employed in educational institutions, the exception allows 
religious schools to refuse to employ, for example, de facto couples, 
single mothers, gays or lesbians without breaching the Act. The current 
Labor government has flagged that it will be seeking to amend the 
legislation to make it more difficult for religious organisations to 
discriminate on the basis of their faith or sexuality.17 This reflects a
changing social reality in Victoria with growing support for the 
recognition of Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender and Intersexual
(LGBTI) rights in all areas of employment. Any proposed change can 
be expected to be fiercely contested, revealing not only the tension 
between the two rights of religion and equality but, importantly, the 
continuing societal influence of organised religion, and related
interests, particularly the Australian Christian Lobby.
The extent to which religious organisations can rely on this exception 
has been brought into some doubt by the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Christian Youth Camps Ltd & others v Cobaw Community Health 
Service Ltd & others.18 The majority held that the camp was not a 
religious organisation and thus could not rely on the religious 
exemption. It would now seem that how such an organisation is 
established, the activities it performs, as well as how closely they align 
with the espoused religious principles may all be examinable matters 
for an organisation claiming such an exemption in the future.
Under section 27 of the previous 1995 EO Act, an employer could
discriminate on the basis of age in paying an employee under the age 
of 21 years according to her/his age. While this was repealed by the 
2010 Act, the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth),19 which in Victoria, governs 
all but the most senior state public employees, allows for the payment 
of a junior wage for people in this age group and thus has the same 
discriminatory effect. In its 2009 report, SARC recommended that the 
old provisions be amended to allow for trainee wages relating to the 
level of experience or training without reference to a person’s age. It 
recognised that while the federal Age Discrimination Act 2004
continued to authorise youth wages, there was no reason for Victoria 
to follow suit.20
                                                                
17 Henrietta Cook, ‘Religious Groups Hit out at Labor’s Move to Rewrite State’s 
Equal Opportunity Laws’ (2014) The Age Online, December 8, 
<http://www.theage.com.au/action/printArticle?id=63954978>.
18 (2014) VSCA 75.
19 See eg, Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) sub-s 153 (3), 195 (3).
20 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Exceptions and Exemptions to the 
Equal Opportunity Act 1995—Final Report (Parliament of Victoria, November, 
2009).
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The EO Act 2010 remained silent on this particular matter, failing to 
take advantage of the opportunity to counter the federal position and 
bring itself into line with a number of other states. The 2011 
amendments, reflecting the then Coalition government’s industrial 
position favouring employers, reinstated the original 1995 provision 
for age related payments for those under 21 years 
(s 28A). At the other end of the age spectrum, the Act allows 
discrimination, though more narrowly drawn, as to particular activities 
in relation to both age benefits and concessions (s 87) and in relation to 
eligibility to superannuation funds (ss 78 and 79). Compared to the 
issue of youth wages, the public policy purpose here is more defensible
but it also reveals, as reflected in other social policies, that political 
decision-makers identify the cohort of people over 60 years of age as a
more potent social and political force than the under 21 years of age
cohort.
Part 4 of the EO Act 2010 provides for a number of specific exceptions 
and these are identified in terms of either or both the persons or groups 
of persons or a particular activity. Discrimination is also permitted by 
the Act on the basis of political belief or activity (where employment 
is with a political party or a Minister of Parliament), and also where 
only offering employment to a person with a particular attribute when 
that employment is to provide service for people with the same 
attribute. The direct relevance of a person’s political beliefs or activity 
when employed by a political party or a Minister of Parliament makes 
this restriction both obvious and sensible. The specificity of this 
discriminatory ground can be contrasted with the general nature of the 
exception applying to employment by a religious body or institution. 
Other provisions proscribe qualifying bodies from discriminating but 
these bodies are able to set reasonable terms in relation to the 
qualification required to enable a disabled person to qualify for a
relevant profession. In another provision, which represents a policy tilt 
in favour of small enterprises, partnerships of less than five can only 
discriminate where reasonable while, more generally, employers can 
claim an exception in respect of unpaid or volunteer workers.
Recognising a growing awareness of sexual harassment, provision is 
made for unpaid or volunteer workers to make claims under this
ground.
The liberal notion of a public/private regulatory divide is highlighted 
in section 24 where an employer can discriminate in respect of 
domestic or personal services21 even though the EO Act 2010 removed
the exception available for family and small businesses to practise 
discrimination, as recommended by the 2009 Victorian Parliament’s 
                                                                
21 This has been extended to cover the employment of people who work in employment 
agencies and who provide domestic or personal care services staff, if so requested: 
section 24 of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010.
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Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC) report. In line 
with changes in labour regulation covering the private sphere, the 
separation of the private or domestic sphere of activity from the public 
one was more tightly drawn. However, it was only in the public sphere
where there was full regulation by anti-discrimination legislation, with 
obligations applicable across all the Act’s grounds. The exception now
relates to either the employer’s home or if the services are to be 
provided in the home of another who has requested such 
discrimination. In similar fashion, the Charter excludes its jurisdiction 
over a public authority if it applies its activities to ‘an act or decision 
of a private nature’ but fails to provide further guidance as to what 
constitutes ‘private’ for these purposes (ss 38 (3)). In contemporary 
society with its diversity of employment arrangements and commercial 
transactions, this distinction between the regulated public and 
unregulated private spheres is a social construction that continues to 
reflect ‘western liberal thought which traditionally removed the family 
or home life from public scrutiny’.22 Reviews of the Charter to date 
have not sought to either clarify what is meant by ‘private’ or to 
recommend a tightening of this provision.
B ‘Protective’ Exceptions
The EO Act 2010 allows an ‘educational authority’ to operate an 
educational institution or program wholly or mainly for students of a 
particular sex, race, religious belief, age or age group or students with 
a general or particular impairment’ (s 39). Reasonable adjustments are 
also required to be made for any person with an impairment so they can 
benefit from the educational program on offer (s 40) and an authority 
can then seek an exemption if the person still cannot participate after 
section 40 has been complied with and reasonable adjustments have 
been made (s 41). Equally, exceptions can be sought by an educational 
authority for an age-based admission scheme or a quota in relation to 
students of different ages or age groups (s 43). These derogations have 
a protective rationale aimed at promoting inclusion by otherwise 
disadvantaged groups or recognising differences (including gender 
based), which are needed to avoid possible discriminatory outcomes.
This recognition of difference and protective mechanisms such as 
quotas result from a changing social reality promoting greater social 
                                                                
22 Margaret Thornton, ‘The Public/Private Dichotomy: Gendered and Discriminatory’ 
(1991) 18 (4) Journal of Law and Society 448, 453.
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inclusion with calls upon the state for positive intervention to address 
perceived inequalities.  
Other specific exceptions relate to clubs for minority cultures (s 66), 
single sex (s 68) or of particular age groups (s 67), and separate access 
for men and women (s 69) but the onus is on the applicant to show, for 
example, that it is necessary to preserve a minority culture. A club or 
sport must satisfy the objective test of reasonableness as to its particular 
circumstances to avoid a claim of discrimination. Related ‘protective’ 
exceptions are to be found in relation to competitive sporting activities 
and the exclusion of persons on the basis of sex or gender identity but 
these exceptions have been tightened to restrict their application to 
where strength, stamina or physique is relevant, exclusion is necessary 
for progression to elite, national or international competition, or to 
facilitate the participation of people of the non-excluded sex (ss 72 (1), 
72 (1A) and 72 (1B)). 
Difference is also recognised in other ways in the EO Act where 
discrimination is allowed on the basis of disability and physical 
features where this would be reasonably necessary for overarching 
public policy purposes such as to protect the health, safety or property 
of any person (ss 86 (1)). Similarly, services, benefits or facilities can 
be established to meet the ‘special needs’ of people with a particular 
attribute, with eligibility to access these services limited to those 
persons and without proving any particular disadvantage (s 88). An 
employer can limit the offering of positions to people of one sex where 
there is a genuine occupational requirement that employees be people 
of that sex or be necessary for the authenticity or credibility in art or 
performance (s 26) but this exception is only available in certain 
circumstances and reflects societal developments acknowledging 
gender differences, sensitivity and respect.  
This plethora of general or automatic exceptions reflects society’s 
recognition that disadvantage can take many forms and the state has 
particular responsibilities to try to minimise the impact of any such 
disadvantages. The protective exceptions remain so as to ensure that 
‘equality of opportunity’ is not distorted by people with specific 
identifiable differences being otherwise given ‘same treatment’. Given 
their aim to promote substantive equality, these protective exceptions
constitute important departures from the Act’s underlying dominant 
principle of formal equality. 
C Temporary Exemptions
Temporary exemptions are permissions granted by the Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) to a particular person or 
organisation, effectively excusing them from compliance. They 
perform the role of safety valves which promote flexibility in the equal 
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opportunity regime. An exemption can only exist for five years, be
specific or general in nature and may, for example, be sought if the 
person or class of persons, or conduct or activity is not covered by an 
exception but where an argument can be made that it should apply in 
particular circumstances. An exemption may be allowed by the 
Tribunal even though an exception might only apply to a part of the 
conduct or an aspect of that conduct. For example, it may be that only 
some aspects of a role being performed in a business or in an 
educational authority attract an exception such as where an inherent 
requirement for a job be that it be occupied by a woman. In such a case, 
the Tribunal could then grant an exemption for the other aspects of the 
role so that only a woman would be employed in the position.23
In considering such an application, the Tribunal not only examines
whether an exception or exemption already applies but whether the 
conduct would amount to prohibited discrimination, the relevant 
circumstances of the case and importantly, whether the exemption is a 
reasonable limitation on the right to equality in the Charter, as given in 
section 8 of the Charter (s 90 of the EO Act). A further consideration 
was brought out in the Boeing Australia Holdings 
case24 which involved employing only persons who were Australian 
citizens in certain parts of its workforce so as to satisfy US International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations. The Tribunal accepted an ‘overriding 
public interest’ argument to justify conduct being taken by the 
company outside the statutory prohibitions on discrimination. This 
decision has been rightly criticised for placing economic interests 
ahead of the right to equality25 and reveals the privileging of powerful 
economic interests.
The Tribunal’s discretionary power as to temporary exemptions could 
now be subject to the reasonable limitations test as provided in section
7 (2) of the Charter and in Lifestyle Communities Pty Ltd (No.3)26,
Justice Bell sought to give meaning to the application of the Charter
and said the Tribunal must undertake a ‘balancing act’ between the
nature of the right being limited and the importance, purpose, nature 
and extent of the proposed limitation. To be compatible with the 
Charter, an exemption must thus either be a measure under section 8
                                                                
23 Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, Applying for an 
Exemption under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010, Seminar, (VEOHRC, 31 July 
2012) 7.
24 Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) (2007) VCAT 
532.
25 Law Institute of Victoria submission to the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee’s hearing: Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Exceptions and 
Exemptions to the Equal Opportunity Act 1995—Options Paper (Parliament of 
Victoria, May 2009) 148–49.
26 Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination) (Lifestyle Communities) 
(2009) VCAT 1869.
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(4), akin to a special measure under the EO Act 2010, or a justified 
limitation on human rights under section 7 (2).27 A similar case to the 
Boeing case was the BAE Systems case.28 In this case, which related to 
circumstances after the Charter came into effect, the Tribunal granted 
an exemption but placed certain employment restrictions upon the 
applicant’s business, requiring them to enter into negotiations to lessen 
the coverage and impact of the exemption. 
Such decisions generally favour major economic interests over social 
ones and have a certain precedential value making it difficult for other 
jurisdictions not to grant similar exemptions where millions of dollars 
in profits are at stake.29 The Tribunal has a wide discretion to grant 
exemptions and it remains unclear as to whether it will be prepared to 
follow Justice Bell and limit this discretion by reference to the Charter. 
While the Tribunal’s power to grant, renew or revoke exemptions 
under the EO Act is as a ‘public authority’ as defined by and subject to 
the Charter,30 there is no conclusive evidence to show that the Tribunal 
considers that this exercise of power is so constrained. There is no 
doubt that the Tribunal has sought to address the balance of rights and 
interests in considering applications for temporary exemptions. Yet, 
not surprisingly, its decisions are made within the broader social 
liberalist context and reveal the influence of important economic 
interests and the checking of rights. 
D Positive Discrimination
As with other anti-discrimination statutes, the EO Act recognises the 
need for ‘measures to be taken to ensure that persons from all sections 
of society have a genuinely equal chance of satisfying the criteria for 
access to a particular social good’31 and seeks to do this through a 
number of positive measures in favour of certain individuals or groups.
These measures are arguably the most protective of the EO Act’s 
measures and represent some recognition of a changing and more 
inclusive social context. As forms of discrimination, they are directed 
towards the goal of equality of results or outcomes, thereby playing an 
important role in seeking to balance rights within the EO Act.
The EO Act allows organisations to take special measures to promote 
or realise substantive equality (s 12) and such measures can cover all 
grounds or attributes. The measures are available for a group of people 
with one or more protected attributes such as race, sex or disability and 
                                                                
27 Bill Swannie, ‘House Rules’ (2010) 84 (7) Law Institute Journal 58, 60.
28 BAE Systems Australia Limited (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) (2012) VCAT 
349.
29 Thornton, above n 16.
30 Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, Victorian 
Discrimination Law (VEOHRC, 2013) 78.
31 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 19.
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are usually provided where a special need exists and for groups or a 
class of people. In Victoria someone can be granted a special measure
in the form of a temporary individual exemption.32 Under the EO Act 
such an exemption need not be for an existing designated job but can 
be given where a designated position is created to promote substantive 
equality in an organisation. For example, Aboriginal employment in 
the public sector has been facilitated by a toolkit which provides for 
either ‘identified jobs’ which, while open to all, require a sound 
knowledge of Aboriginal community, society and culture or where 
‘designated jobs’ are only open to Aboriginal candidates.33
The test to determine whether something is a special measure for the 
purpose of promoting equality was established in 1985 by the High 
Court in Gerhardy v Brown34. For the High Court, a measure would 
qualify if it conferred a benefit, was conferred on members of a class, 
membership of which is based on an identified characteristic, and the 
measure was for their advancement. The EO Act has expanded on this 
High Court classification by requiring that a special measure must be 
undertaken in good faith, be reasonably likely to achieve its purpose of 
promoting or realising substantive equality, be a proportionate means 
of achieving the purpose, and be justified because the members of the 
group have a particular need for advancement or assistance (s 12 (3)).
For example, an educational provider may decide to create a bursary 
each year to provide accommodation for one Indigenous student who 
lives remotely. However, the measure would fail the test if its purpose 
was found to not be the promotion or realisation of substantive equality. 
The Commission sees a special measure as a ‘balancing mechanism to 
facilitate equality but not unfairly advance one group over another once 
the playing field is even.’35 These positive measures are important but 
their capacity to effect change is inhibited given they can only be 
applied on a case by case basis and do not directly address more general 
issues of indirect discrimination, particularly in employment and 
education. Such measures amount to tacit recognition that without 
reference to such promotion of substantive equality, the Act is only 
focusing on the provision of formal equality.
The EO Act has taken a more forthright approach to challenging 
powerful societal interests where it places a positive duty upon 
employers to take reasonable and proportionate measures to eliminate 
discrimination, sexual harassment and victimisation, with even greater 
                                                                
32 Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian Anti-discrimination Law 
(Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 525.
33 Kate Jenkins, ‘Equal Opportunity Act 2010—Reflections and Opportunities’, 
Speech to Victorian Government Solicitors Office Seminar (24 March 2014) 8.
34 (1985) 159 CLR 70, 126.
35 Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, Special Measures
(VEOHRC, Melbourne, 2015).
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responsibilities placed upon large organisations (s 15). Where these 
organisations are public authorities, they must also act in accordance 
with section 38 of the Charter. While this additional duty upon
employers under the EO Act represents a move away from the 
individual complaints-based model, it is written in hortatory rather than 
mandatory language.36 The person introducing a special measure
rightly has the onus of proof, but whether it meets the test or should be 
modified still depends on someone submitting a complaint to the effect 
that the dominant purpose of a special measure is not the general 
promotion and realisation of substantive equality. Thus, in deference to 
its underlying liberalist principles, the Act here continues to rely on 
individuals for enforcement.37
E Defences to Discrimination
Defences are internal exceptions and can only be entertained once the 
duty or duties under the EO Act 2010 have been admitted. The defence 
of statutory authority enables a person to be released from the 
obligations imposed on them by the anti-discrimination laws so that 
they can comply with the requirements of another statute (s 75). The 
High Court has, in the past, stated that such a defence should not be 
interpreted expansively38 and in Victoria, as in a number of other states, 
the defence is only available when it is ‘necessary’ for the respondent 
to act as he or she did in order ‘to comply with’ the requirements of 
another statute.39 In so making the EO Act subservient to all other Acts, 
this provision emphasises the ‘ordinariness’ of the EO Act and while 
SARC, in its 2009 Report, recommended the provision’s repeal within 
a reasonable timeframe,40 the then government did not support this 
recommendation. This was a missed opportunity for if human rights 
norms are to be placed at the centre of public policy, a provision such 
as this should either be repealed or be made subject to serious 
restrictions. 
F Limitations in the EO Act’s Regulatory 
Design
Equal opportunity legislation in Australia reflects it liberal foundations 
and provides the individual complaint mechanism as the means by 
which to seek redress. The Labor government had trumpeted as one of 
its objectives in the EO Act 2010 that it would seek to give the 
                                                                
36 Thornton, above n 16, 244.
37 Dominique Allen, ‘Victoria Paves the Way to Eliminating Discrimination’ (2010) 
23 (4) Australian Journal of Labour Law 318.
38 Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349, 413.
39 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 32, 563.
40 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Exceptions and Exemptions to the 
Equal Opportunity Act 1995—Final Report (Victoria, Parliament of Victoria, 
November, 2009) 55.
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Commission the power not only to respond to individual complaints 
but to inquire into systemic discrimination directed against entire 
groups. Systemic discrimination was addressed in the Second Reading 
Speech to the 2010 Bill and in the Explanatory Memorandum41 one 
positive outcome from the resultant legislation was that the 
Commission could focus on broader, more systemic, issues rather than 
investigating all complaints.42 Overall, however, the resultant 
legislation made only tentative steps in this direction, principally 
through the further resourcing of the Commission’s educative role.43
The Commission was given an enforcement role by the EO Act 2010
similar to that given to the Fair Work Ombudsman and the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission to move it towards a 
compliance driven model rather than a purely complaints model. On
the basis of information received, the Commission can investigate how 
a group or class of persons were being treated in an organisation and 
should discrimination be found, it could exercise a range of powers,
including issuing a compliance notice. However, these new 
Commission powers were amended in the 2011 Act before they had 
come into operation, limiting its powers to either enter into an 
agreement with a person about action required to comply with the Act 
or to refer the matter to the Tribunal (s 139).44
The then Coalition government obviously considered that giving the 
Commission additional enforcement powers was at odds with how it 
envisaged the regulatory role of this Act within what it considered to 
be the social reality of the time with its prescription for a (neo)liberal 
and non-interventionist policy approach. In the words of the then 
Attorney-General, ‘[T]he 2010 Act did not achieve a fair balance 
between the competing rights and obligations that make up the equal 
opportunity framework. It failed to recognise the potential for harm that 
it created by giving the [Commission] sweeping coercive powers…’45
Leaving the Commission with this limited set of powers has been 
criticised for consigning it to be ‘a watchdog that can bark but cannot 
bite’46 and highlights the problem that anti-discrimination regulation 
                                                                
41 Attorney General Hulls referred to shifting ‘from complaints processing to 
encouraging and facilitating best practice and compliance through education, 
information and advice’: Victoria, Parliament of Victoria, 2010, Explanatory 
Memorandum, Equal Opportunity Bill 2.
42 The Commission can issue practice guidelines or provide advice on an action plan 
which an organisation may voluntarily develop to improve compliance with the EO 
Act.
43 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 32, 31.
44 The Commission can still also report the matter to the Attorney-General or directly 
to Parliament.
45 See above n 15, 1363.
46 Dominique Allen, ‘Equal Opportunity. Unfinished business’ (2011) 36 (4) 
Alternative Law Journal 273, 274.
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continues to be considered a threat to the interests of some powerful 
political forces.
IV THE CHARTER AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The Charter approaches the matter of the protection and promotion of 
human rights from a different perspective to Victoria’s anti-
discrimination legislation even though anti-discrimination is one of the 
Charter’s foundational principles. The definition of discrimination in 
section 3(1) is written in similar terms to the EO Act 2010 and the 
government has accepted the recommendation of the 2015 Charter 
Review that the Charter’s definition of discrimination be clarified and 
linked to the EO Act by limiting it to ‘direct or indirect discrimination’ 
on the basis of a protected attribute in the EO Act 2010.47 The Charter,
as a parliamentary bill of rights, is a much broader instrument in its 
scope and is designed to influence all other legislation, present and 
future, to encourage rights compatibility through the issuing of 
Statements of Compatibility (s 28) and to promote rights-based 
decision-making by public authorities (s 38). 
The breadth of the Charter’s scope needs to be balanced against other
design features which have a limiting impact upon its operation. The 
Charter ensures the supremacy of parliament, with the judiciary only 
able to make Statements of Inconsistency when comparing a statute to
the Charter rather than declaring the statute invalid (s 36). Also, 
Parliament need only engage in a dialogue with both the judiciary and 
the community over any incompatible legislation. These restrictions 
are not unusual for such a bill of rights and together constitute a key 
mechanism for an institutional dialogue about rights rather than a
monologue by one institution.48
The Charter states from the outset that no right is absolute and each
should be seen as balanced against both other rights and against other 
competing interests. The government has held to that position despite 
arguments that some rights should be recognised as absolute, such as 
the right to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.49 While the Charter is careful not to be so comprehensive as 
                                                                
47 Michael Brett Young, From Commitment to Culture. The 2015 Review of the Charter 
of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Victorian Government, 2015) 227; 
Department of Justice and Regulation, Government response to the 2015 review of 
the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act (Victoria, Department of 
Justice and Regulation, 2016) 14.
48 Julie Debeljak, ‘Balancing Rights in a Democracy: the Problems with Limitations 
and Overrides of Rights under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 422, 423.
49 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission to the Inquiry and Review of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities (Human Rights Law Centre, 2011),
< http://hrlc.org.au/submissions-to-the-review-of-the-victorian-charter/> 77.
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to limit, by act or omission, any right that is available under any other 
legislation (s 5), it only includes civil and political rights, as well as one 
provision on indigenous cultural rights (s 19) and one on property 
rights (s 20).
Economic, social and cultural rights were explicitly given in the Terms 
of Reference for consideration in the 2011 Charter Review but, 
reflecting strong opposition, the committee did not recommend their 
inclusion, something readily accepted by the then government.50
Subsection 3(d) of the EO Act 2010 explicitly refers to social and 
economic disadvantage being a possible outcome of discrimination 
with reasonable adjustments, reasonable accommodation and the 
taking of special measures possibly required to deliver substantive 
equality. These adjustment measures may well enable economic, social 
and cultural rights to be addressed in an indirect and at least partial 
manner. The Terms of Reference for the 2015 Charter Review did not 
explicitly raise the inclusion of these rights and the reviewer chose not 
to make such a recommendation. However, the government has 
accepted the reviewer’s ‘housekeeping’ recommendation that the 
Charter’s definition of human rights be extended to include all rights in 
the Charter, not just civil and political rights.51
In addition to possible specific internal limitations on rights within the 
Charter, there is a general limitation provision in section 752 which acts 
across all the specific Charter rights.53 Contrary to the operation of the 
EO Act, this general limitation section provides a test to aid in assessing 
whether a particular restriction is reasonable. The limitation must be 
provided under law, be reasonable, and its imposition on human rights 
be justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom (s 7(2)). The use of the word ‘reasonable’ aims 
to give it an objective test. As used in the EO Act, such language is 
open-textured and without further interpretation and explanation, 
effectively gives this limiting provision a very broad scope. This 
limiting of rights is provided by a test consisting of an explicit list of 
five factors. These are the nature of the right, the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the 
                                                                
50 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, Victorian Government Response, 
Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Parliament of 
Victoria, 2012) 6.
51 Brett Young, above n 47, 155. The Reviewer recommended that economic, social 
and cultural rights be a possible item for future review but the government declined 
any such prescriptions for such a review: Department of Justice and Regulation, 
above n 47, 9.
52 Section 7 of the Charter is modelled on section 5 of New Zealand’s Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 and, more particularly, section 36 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
53 Victoria, Parliament of Victoria, Explanatory Memorandum, Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Bill 2006 7–8.
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relationship between the limitation and its purpose, and whether the 
purpose could be achieved reasonably by a less restrictive means (s 7 
(2) (a) to (e)). In terms of how the Charter is designed, this test would 
need to be applied by parliament in assessing any existing or new 
legislation, including the EO Act; by the Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of laws; and by public authorities in discharging their 
responsibilities. 
As well as the general and external limitation provided by section 7 of 
the Charter, rights have been both internally qualified and limited in 
accordance with the law. An internally qualified limitation could 
validly relate to a person’s circumstances such as being detained after 
conviction. An internal limitation would be where the exercise of a
right may be restricted such as to address a matter of national security 
or public safety. Rights can also be limited by other laws so long as 
they are reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society.54
Again, the language is general and open to broad interpretation. In its 
2009 Report, SARC declined to take up the opportunity to consider 
recommending that the exceptions to the EO Act be made subject to the 
five factors used in the Charter to determine their reasonableness and 
justification though it did recommend that the section 7 test be used 
where there was doubt as to the construction of a provision in the EO 
Act.55 There is no legal obligation for the EO Act and the Charter to be 
compatible other than the indirect obligation in terms of the Supreme 
Court’s power to declare whether an Act is inconsistent with the 
Charter (ss 38 and 39 of the Charter). As well, the Charter imposes a
general obligation upon the parliament to consider whether the content 
of all Acts, including the EO Act, are compatible with the Charter (s 32 
of the Charter).
There is some inconsistency in SARC’s arguments for not 
recommending the application of these section 7 rules across and into 
the EO Act. SARC recommended against the test in relation to general 
(or blanket) exceptions and argued that cases precluding other rights 
were rare, citing the example of domestic work in a private house.
While not calling for guiding rules to assess the balance of rights, 
SARC did, however, recommend the use of the Charter’s reasonable 
limitations test for all exceptions other than the general ones.56 The 
government, in its response, was more consistent and stated that even 
specific exceptions need not be subject to the Charter as, in its view,
the Charter already provided an ‘overwhelming framework’ for the EO 
Act.57 This weak government response undoubtedly reflected a desire 
                                                                
54 Debeljak, above n 48, 424–25.
55 Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, above n 40, 8.
56 Ibid 6.
57 Scrutiny and Regulations Committee, Victorian Government Response, Inquiry into
Exceptions and Exemptions to the Equal Opportunity Act 1995, (Parliament of 
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to prevent any constraint on the application of the limitation provisions 
lest they empower claimants under the EO Act.
The Charter’s interpretative provision, section 32, has a remedial 
purpose to ensure that statutory provisions are rights-compatible. 
However, while the section is used to encourage rights-compatible 
interpretations in all legislation, it does not impel one and an important 
limitation here is that the judiciary is not given the power to invalidate 
legislation found not to be amenable to a section 32 rights-compatible 
interpretation. It may be that judicial interpretation of section 32 may 
one day enhance the provision’s power in terms of rights-compatibility 
and that of section 7 in terms of proportionality analysis (and whether 
the limits are proportionate to the aims of the Charter), thereby 
reducing the limiting effect of these provisions. However, examining 
the mix of judicial statements of the High Court in its most recent 
Charter case, the Momcilovic case,58 indicates that we are still some 
distance from such an interpretation. 
The 2015 Charter Review recommended that section 32 of the Charter 
be amended to provide a definition or explanation of ‘compatibility’ 
and that this be explicitly linked to the section 7 (2) proportionality test
with compatibility with human rights seen to occur where there was 
either no limit or that limit was reasonable and demonstrably justifiable 
in terms of section 7(2).59 The government has supported in principle 
the reviewer’s recommendation of the need for clarity as to section 
7(2)’s role in section 32(1) interpretation.60
A Public Authorities and Exceptions to Rights-
Based Service Delivery
Section 38 makes it unlawful for a public authority61 to act in a way 
that is incompatible with, or fails to consider, a human right.  The 
Charter has arguably been at its most effective at the stage when a 
public authority is drafting policy and when processes are being 
                                                                
Victoria, 2010), <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/sarc/EOA_exempt_except/
default.htm> 2.
58 Momcilovic v R (2011) HCA 34. For a discussion of this case, see Pamela Tate, 
‘Statutory Interpretive Techniques under the Charter: Three Stages of the Charter—
Has the Original Conception and Early Technique Survived the Twists of the High 
Court’s Reasoning in Momcilovic’ (2014) 2 Judicial College of Victoria Online 
Journal 43-68; Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Statutory Interpretive Techniques Under the 
Charter—Section 32’ (2014) 2 Judicial College of Victoria Online Journal 69–76.
59 Brett Young, above n 47,155.
60 Department of Justice and Regulation, n 47, 8.
61 The Charter defines a public authority to include an entity whose functions include 
those of a public nature: section 4(1)(c).
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identified.62 Early intervention by an advocate has, on many occasions,
addressed departmental processes that have violated the rights of their 
clients resulting in the policy and/or process being rectified without the 
matter being litigated in the courts.63 In the Slattery case64, the 
Commission interpreted the Tribunal’s decision in this discrimination 
case as confirming that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to examine 
whether, when a public authority acted lawfully under another law, 
such as the EO Act 2010, it had breached the Charter.65
The imperative for public authorities to act in a rights-compatible 
manner when delivering a service is not without exceptions. These
exceptions can undermine the overall effectiveness of section 38 and
arguably reduce the community’s confidence in the authorities’ ability 
to make rights-based decisions. For example, in parallel with the 
public/private divide found in the EO Act 2010, the duty upon public 
authorities to act compatibly with the Charter does not apply in relation 
to an act or decision of a private nature (s 38 (3)). Also, as with the EO 
Act 2010, section 38 (4) of the Charter provides that religious bodies 
acting in conformity with their religious doctrines, beliefs or principles 
are exempt from the application of the Charter. This may soon face 
amendment as, in its response to the 2015 Charter review, the 
government has agreed to consider this provision as part of a broader
examination of religious exceptions in other laws.66
The liberal division of the public/private divide with regard to the role 
and functions of public authorities under the Charter would appear to 
be secure. The government, in its response to the 2015 Charter review, 
rejected the recommendation to establish a Corporate Charter 
Champions Group to build understanding of the Charter and explicitly
confined the educative work of the Commission to bodies with 
obligations under the Charter.67
                                                                
62 Hugh de Krester, ‘Application of the Victorian Human Rights Charter in Legal 
Practice: Discrimination and Equal Opportunity’ (2014) 2 Judicial College of 
Victorian Online Journal, 166, 167.
63 Human Rights Law Centre, Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities in Action. Case studies from the first five years of operation 
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64 Slattery v Manningham City Council (2013) VCAT 1869.
65 Kate Jenkins, ‘Equal Opportunity Act 2010—Reflections and Opportunities’, (2014) 
Speech to Victorian Government Solicitors Office Seminar 5.
66 Department of Justice and Regulation, above n 47, 5.
67 Department of Justice and Regulation, above n 47, 3.
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B The Override Provision and Parliamentary 
Supremacy
The Charter contains an override provision, section 31, that reflects 
parliament’s supremacy within the Act. It is both an essential element 
of the dialogic design of the Charter and an important limitation upon 
the capacity of the Charter to give effect to rights. It acts to suspend 
particular rights, or indeed the entire Charter, for a renewable period of 
five years. Parliament’s override declaration occurs through a
statement to the Parliament explaining the exceptional circumstances 
justifying the override. In effect, the override means that a rights issue
is avoided given that both a section 32 interpretation as to rights 
compatibility and a Supreme Court Declaration of Inconsistent 
Interpretation under section 36 would be considered to no longer apply.
The override provision is, in fact, unnecessary given that the Charter 
already circumscribes judicial powers through parliament’s dominance
and as an ordinary statute, the Charter can easily be amended or 
repealed. The override stipulates that it only applies to exceptional 
circumstances but these circumstances equate with ordinary limitations 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.68 The chair of the consultative 
committee which recommended the Charter saw the override provision 
as allowing ‘political imperatives’ to be met without amending the 
Charter even though this meant that laws could still be made which did
not meet the limitation test under section 7.69 Should a law be 
incompatible with the Charter but reflect the social reality as 
interpreted by political decision-makers, the override provision could 
prove to be a useful mechanism for government even if by using it, it
served to sacrifice the Charter’s own dialogic processes. The 2015 
Charter Reviewer was unconvinced the override declaration would 
‘serve the policy purpose of acting as a brake on limitations of human 
rights’ or was otherwise necessary and recommended that section 31 
be repealed.70 The government declined to support this 
recommendation citing the value of the provision as a ‘clear statement 
of parliamentary sovereignty’.71 From this we can assume that the 
government, which did not counter the reviewer’s argument for repeal, 
                                                                
68 Debeljak, above n 48, 444.
69 George Williams, ‘The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: 
Origins and Scope’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 880, 899.
70 Brett Young, above n 47, 198.
71 Department of Justice and Regulation, above n 47, 13.
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remains concerned that removal of the provision would be identified as 
a radical step in changing the Charter’s overall design.72
C Limiting the Charter’s Value as a Tool for 
Litigation
Another weakness in the Charter’s ability to give effect to its protected 
rights is the lack of an independent cause of action for those seeking 
some relief or remedy through litigation (s 39 (1)). This is despite the 
existence of a separate cause of action for a breach of the Human Rights 
Act 2004 (ACT). Another important limit which has undoubtedly 
diminished the value of the Charter as a tool of litigation is the 
provision that a person cannot be awarded damages for any breach of 
the Charter (s 39 (3)). This is despite damages being a commonly 
sought remedy and existing under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZ), one of the Acts upon which the Charter was modelled.
In the 2011 Charter review, arguments that there was ‘much confusion 
and unnecessary complication’ in having to establish an existing cause 
of action independent of the Charter73 were rejected by SARC. It saw 
arguments calling for both an independent cause of action and the 
remedy of damages as creating ‘an absence of boundaries in relation to 
the Charter [meaning] that remedies decisions…may operate in ways 
that undermine both the established jurisdictional limits of courts and 
tribunals...’74 Similar arguments for the inclusion of an independent
cause of action and damages were presented to the 2015 review of the 
Charter.75 This time the review recommended an independent cause of 
action for the Charter, the giving of original jurisdiction for Charter 
claims to VCAT, but declined to recommend a remedy in damages.76
Together with the recommendation to give the Commission a dispute 
resolution function under the Charter,77 the government responded that 
it would consider the matter further. This undoubtedly reflects some 
discomfort with giving the Charter an independent cause of action 
                                                                
72 Probably for the same reason the government, in its response to the 2015 Charter 
Review, declined to remove the redundant section 15 (3) limitation on the right to 
freedom of speech: Department of Justice and Regulation, above n 47, 9.
73 See eg, Human Rights Law Centre, above n 49, 45.
74 Scrutiny of Act and Regulations Committee, Review of Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities (Parliament of Victoria, 2011) 72.
75 See eg, Human Rights Law Centre, ‘More Accessible, More Effective and Simpler
to Enforce: Strengthening Victoria’s Human Rights Charter’ (2015) Submission to 
the 2015 Review of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights, 
<https://myviews.justice.vic.gov.au/2015-review-of-the-charter-of-human-rights>
Recommendation 11.
76 Brett Young, above n 47, 131.
77 This may simply be due to resource implications of establishing a dispute resolution 
facility for Charter complaints, but the government in its response does not provide 
evidence that this is the case.
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which might elicit an adverse reaction from powerful social and 
economic interests given the Charter’s broad jurisdiction.78
V CONCLUDING COMMENTS
There is little doubt that the Charter and the EO Act have taken Victoria 
further along the path towards the protection and realisation of certain 
rights. It is also accepted that few, if any, rights are absolute and that 
Acts such as these need ‘safety valves’ to ensure governments do not 
feel pressed into hastily amending or repealing them. These Acts are, 
of course, not above the interference of interests and the rights which 
they seek to promote and the effectiveness of such legislation remains
‘contingent upon the discretion of government …to repeal those rights 
should they see fit, for example, in response to the dictates of economic 
or political expediency’.79
The focus of these Acts must not be on how they might work in a 
perfect world but on how they actually work in their own social and 
economic context. Here the dominant neoliberal political discourse 
privileges the market and remains too often prepared to divide the 
private off from regulation that is found in the public domain, while 
also serving to benefit powerful social interests (such as religious 
organisations) or economic interests (such as big business) for the sake 
of avoiding political conflict.
It is something of a paradox that Acts of Parliament, when presented as 
rights instruments, are often presented as being more important than 
ordinary statutes, replete with hortatory statements relating to how 
people should behave according to certain ideals. The normative and 
aspirational tone of these Acts and their specific rights have been taken 
from international human rights instruments without much translation. 
It is worth noting, however, that there really are no rights that are pre-
politics or above politics.80 The two rights instruments discussed in this 
article need to be recognised for what they are: social constructs each 
a product of a certain period in time. This is nowhere more obviously 
the case than when their respective limitations and derogations are 
considered. While rights instruments can be empowering for minority 
or marginalised interests, each should also be recognised as containing 
the means within its design and structure to restrict and constrain that 
power. These constraints are not boundary matters but go to the very 
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centre of what these statutes purport to promote, the protection of 
rights. 
The dominant political discourse frames the right to equality in terms 
of formal rather than substantive equality. While giving some 
allowance for protective exceptions and special measures, the form,
process and the appearance of equality are more important within the 
EO Act than the equality of results. The prevailing social structure 
privileges certain social and economic interests. It is as a testament to 
the perception that such a rights instrument potentially challenges the
power and influence of such interests that there continue to be a number 
of important general and specific derogations affecting the Act’s 
operation. This is nowhere more obvious than in regard to the religious 
exceptions and the retention of a notion of a public/private divide 
which is used to justify the immunity of certain activities from public 
regulation long after such regulation has been otherwise accepted. 
Rights and interests come closer to being balanced within the EO Act 
when the Tribunal considers temporary exemptions and has applied the 
Charter’s section 7 test. Yet, even here there are decisions which have 
favoured particular powerful social or economic interests. The Charter
is internally limited and, as an ordinary statute, can be easily amended 
or repealed.  Its internal limitations, including the open-textured 
language of its protected rights and the section 7 general limitations,
together with its external limiting mechanisms such as the override 
provision, combine to ensure that the Charter is sufficiently checked.
This means that as it seeks to give effect to certain rights, the Charter
will not be allowed to depart from what Victoria’s dominant social and 
economic actors consider to be the contemporary social reality, as that
has been interpreted by political decision-makers.
Interpreting these rights instruments by their limitations is not to deny 
their empowering potential. On the contrary, highlighting these 
derogations helps to reveal that, as socially constructed instruments, 
they are ambivalent in terms of whose interests they serve. That they 
exist at all is as a result of social changes promoting rights which have 
been able to challenge the dominant social and economic interests
through the provision of both socio-legal and legal means to address 
vulnerability and marginalisation. Those provisions within each statute 
that empower individuals and their advocates to seek to protect their 
rights are well-matched by other provisions that act to contain the 
extent of the rights protecting and promotion functions of each Act.
These limiting provisions are no mere accidental or peripheral 
encumbrances and, while not beyond challenge, should be recognised 
for their highly influential role in the proper interpretation of these 
rights instruments. 
